When an outbreak of Foot-and-mouth Disease (FMD) occurs it is essential to assess the potential for spread from any source farm. This involves determining the likelihood of spread by all of the mechanisms, one of which is from airborne virus released by infected animals. This paper describes the method by which airborne disease spread is assessed in the United Kingdom.
The Institute for Animal Health Pirbright Laboratory (IAH), Met Office UK and Department for Food Environment and Rural Affairs (Defra) have actively researched both laboratory and field outbreaks of FMD and the results have informed the current operational procedure. One of the major tools used in the assessment process is the Met Office UK NAME model (Numerical Atmospheric Modelling Environment). This computer model requires, as input, a detailed description of the disease on the infected premises together with knowledge of the airborne characteristics of the virus strain involved and meteorological data representative of the area. If the outbreak is situated in a valley or hillside local flows may substantially influence the pattern of disease spread; this may be assessed by the inclusion of a local flow model within NAME.
Providing an accurate assessment of the risk of airborne disease spread is a complex task and experience shows that each outbreak is unique. The significance of airborne disease transmission depends upon the interaction of individual components in the transmission chain. Consequently, before an area of risk can be determined with confidence, all of the available information must be carefully recorded and assessed. To be of operational use this task must be completed quickly and therefore requires a rugged and fully flexible system to be in place and to have been tested regularly.
Introduction:
Defra are responsible in the United Kingdom for the control and eradication of outbreaks of FMD. When disease is first suspected they need to quickly assess how disease entered the country and identify and limit any secondary spread. The appropriate control measures can then be implemented. There is strong evidence, from the laboratory and the field, to suggest that airborne transmission of FMD can play an important role in initiating a FMD outbreak and determining the course of a disease spread once in a country (Hugh-Jones and Wright 1970; Donaldson et al. 1982; Gloster et al. 2003) . Fortunately outbreaks of disease in the UK are relatively rare events, but when they do occur they can have a significant impact on the agricultural industry and a number of other business and leisure activities (Thompson et al. 2002) . To minimise the length of any disease incursion and the economic losses it is important to have a robust, regularly tested, operationally proven system in place by which airborne disease spread can be reliably assessed.
Over the years Defra, IAH Pirbright Laboratory and Met Office, UK have worked closely together to design and implement an operational procedure which has the capability of operating 24 hours per day 365 days per year. The work requires close collaboration of Defra field and headquarters staff together with epidemiologists and research workers from the IAH and meteorologists from the Met Office UK Environment Monitoring and Response Centre (EMARC) and the Atmospheric Dispersion Group (ADG). In addition close links are maintained with the Danish Meteorological Institute and RisØ National Laboratory. This paper describes the operational procedure used in the UK and discusses its strengths and limitations Materials and Methods: Figure 1 gives the actions and responsibilities in the event of a suspect/confirmed outbreak of FMD in the UK.
Once Defra are notified of a suspected case of FMD the State Veterinary Service are responsible, amongst other duties, for taking appropriate samples for diagnosis by the IAH, establishing the precise status of disease on the premises and its development from its initial introduction. They may be assisted in this task by an Epidemiological Team comprising of representatives from Defra and other organisations such as the IAH and Met Office.
The FMD FAO World Reference Laboratory based at IAH then performs diagnostic tests to determine if FMD virus is present. These tests which include antigen-ELISA, virus isolation and automated real-time RT-PCR molecular assays have the capability to generate diagnostic results within 4 hours, 24 to 96 hours and 8 hours respectively. The particular strain involved is an important parameter for predicting airborne spread and is identified by VP1 genome sequencing, which may take an additional 24 hours or more to determine All livestock on the premises are clinically examined and the age of lesions recorded. A virus emission profile is then constructed by the Epidemiological Team, informed by the results from previous research measurements. If the virus characteristics are unknown further laboratory based experiments are initiated; these require infecting a number of animals with the strain involved and measuring the concentration of virus emitted with time. Additionally a number of susceptible animals are exposed to any airborne virus released from the infected animals. These experiments take at least a few weeks to perform. Until this information is available the model(s), described below, are run using parameters approximating best through to worst case scenarios.
As soon as disease is suspected or confirmed Defra notify EMARC and request meteorological support in assessing the potential for disease spread by airborne virus. EMARC was established in 1999 as a specialist operational unit, within the Met Office, UK to provide a co-ordinated and rapid meteorological response to environmental incidents including FMD. It has a forecaster on duty 24-hours a day, every day of the year. EMARC are required to provide Defra with wind, relative humidity, temperature and precipitation data from the nearest representative observation site, within six hours of notification. The data is provided for the period that disease is initially estimated to have existed on the infected premises. In addition a weather forecast for the following days is supplied to help field staff plan for operational work.
ADG are responsible for the assessment of airborne disease spread. For a new introduction of disease a full meteorological and modelling assessment is made, irrespective of circumstances. In the event of secondary cases all outbreaks involving pigs, the most prolific of virus emitters of virus will be modelled. Experience of outbreaks involving type "O" virus have led to the formulation of a decision tree for other secondary outbreaks (Figure 2 ). For a new incursion of disease, possibly of a different virus strain, the values where a full assessment and a simple wind sector analysis for cattle (>10) and sheep (>20) may vary and are likely to be influenced by a number of factors including the virus strain and number of secondary outbreaks detected in the field. ADG's first task is to produce a best estimate of the meteorological conditions experienced at and down-wind of the outbreak. This may use observational data routinely collected by the Met Office or, from observations taken by the Epidemiological Team or, from other local sources e.g. local Highway Authority automatic weather stations. In addition numerical weather prediction model data (NWP), produced as part of the Met Office's weather forecasting process, can be extracted for any geographical location. In the construction of the appropriate database the presence of any local flows caused by a combination of synoptic conditions, topography, proximity to the sea, urban conurbations and time of day need to be taken into account. Significant meteorological conditions which, from previous studies, have been shown to favour airborne disease spread will also be identified; these are either when the atmospheric boundary layer has significantly limited upwards dispersion of virus and surface winds are light or the wind is from a constant direction for substantial periods of time (Gloster et al. 2005) .
ADG then identify the most appropriate NAME model configuration to use (Ryall and Maryon 1998) . NAME was originally developed by the Met Office as a medium to long range atmospheric dispersion model following the Chernobyl incident in 1986, but has since evolved into an allpurpose dispersion model predicting the transport, transformation and deposition of a wide class of airborne materials including FMD . NAME is a Lagrangian model in which large numbers of particles are released into the model atmosphere. The particles are advected by threedimensional winds obtained from either NWP model data or single site wind observations (u, v, w) . Each particle represents a certain mass of the released substance which can be depleted over time, if appropriate, due to wet and dry deposition, decay processes and chemical transformations. NAME has a number of configurations which can be selected to best model the conditions involved. For example the nature of the source can be defined (point source, release over an area, height of release), the surface conditions varied (town, coast, urban area, agricultural) and topographical effects included at the appropriate resolution. The scale of the model can also be varied from a few km to many tens or hundreds of km. NAME can be run in a forward mode, releasing particles from the suspected source and analysing the subsequent transport and spread of the virus and the predicted concentrations at particular receptor points. The model can also be run backwards in time to determine the origin of an airborne source of infection; this capability is important as the first reported case may not be the index case.
No single model perfectly captures the dispersion of particulate matter in the atmosphere. To minimise the idiosyncratic effects of a single model the output from NAME is likely to be compared with model output from other sources; close relationships are maintained between IAH/Met Office and the Danish authorities and model comparisons are likely to be made. These comparisons are made as part of a range of studies including FMD; "peace-time" comparisons are made on an occasional basis. To ensure ease of comparison the models are run using the same virus emission profile and the output units produced in a standard format.
Once all of the information is produced it is closely scrutinised, experience from past and current outbreaks added (possibly from those taking place on another continent) and allowance for model limitations made. A final consolidated risk map is produced giving the risk in four categories (high, medium, low and cannot be excluded). The areas are based on the estimation of either the integrated concentration over the whole emission period or from the maximum hourly concentration during the same period. An example of a risk map is given at Figure 3 . This information, together with a verbal/text briefing is passed to Defra, within 48 hours of initial notification of the presence of disease, for discussion within the National Emergency Epidemiological Group. In turn the Group, consisting of epidemiologists, meteorologists and virologists, provides advice on potential action such as enhanced, detailed surveillance, direct contact slaughter etc. in the identified risk area.
Discussion:
The basic procedure described above has been in operation in the UK for a number of years, but remains under regular review ensuring that the most appropriate up to date knowledge is incorporated in the process.
Laboratory studies at the time of the 2001 epidemic and afterwards have led to an improved knowledge of the daily output of virus from pigs, cattle and sheep infected with the UK 2001 strain as a function of the age of clinical lesions and size of animal (e.g. Alexandersen & Donaldson, 2002; Alexandersen et al., 2003a; Alexandersen et al., 2003b; Doel et al., 2006) . Gloster et al. (in preparation) have combined these results and produced a more complete profile of virus emission which is useful as preliminary input to NAME or similar models. However the work has identified that there are considerable fluctuations in virus excretion within individual animals and periods of the day. Consequently, considerable care is needed in using these daily values, especially in changing meteorological conditions and for different virus strains.
In the field it is difficult to assess, with any degree of certainty, hourly virus output from infected animals. At the beginning of an epidemic the amount of virus emitted for each species is not known. Later on the need to slaughter and dispose of animals rapidly has made it difficult in past outbreaks to determine the number and species of animal affected and age of lesions. The age of lesions can vary depending on the strain responsible as well as the expertise of the examiner. Often later in an epidemic inexperienced staff have to be employed in examining animals and ageing lesions. Consequently modellers and those who are required to make operational decisions have to recognise the variable accuracy of one of the prime input parameters (variation of emission as a function of time) and make appropriate allowances when either estimating the area at risk or using the output.
A review of experiments to determine the minimum dose required to infect animals by the intranasal route has confirmed that cattle and sheep are more susceptible to infection than pigs in contrast to emission where pigs excrete the most virus (Sellers & Gloster, submitted for publication). The review proposed that for modelling previous outbreaks and in real time a dose of 8 Infectious Units or 10 ID50 could be used as the minimum dose where cattle and sheep are at risk. However the amounts emitted by individual animals and the dose required to infect individual animals by the intranasal route have been found to vary with the individual and with the strain of virus. Most investigations have been carried out with O strains, but there is a need to examine the characteristics of Asia 1 and SAT 2 strains. Asia 1 has been responsible for outbreaks in Greece in 2000 and in Turkey in 2001 and SAT 2 in Libya in 2002. Asia 1 strain is spreading through Asia and as in 2001 strains could be introduced into the UK and other countries in Europe as could SAT 2 strain (Valarcher et al., 2005) .
In laboratory experiments successful infection by the intranasal route can be achieved in 5 minutes or less after inhalation (Sellers & Gloster, submitted for publication) . This finding is supported by modelling the start of the 2001 UK epidemic of FMD which identified a short period when a significant virus plume would have been blown from the virus source at Heddon-on-the Wall towards Prestwick Hall Farm . However it can be argued that the longer a herd is exposed to a plume the greater the chance of an animal or animals becoming infected. Gloster et al. (2005) found that Hall Farm was likely to have been the source of infection for three farms; the wind was from the virus source for many hours but the virus emission was at relatively low levels throughout. In view of these two different results from the laboratory and field it is thought beneficial to provide both model output based on maximum hourly concentrations and total accumulated concentration for a given location.
Modelling has been carried out on outbreaks during the 2001 epidemic Gloster et al., 2005) . It has been found that in cases where no other cause than airborne infection was identified the dose predicted for successful infection was much lower than that predicted from laboratory findings. Possible explanations include the accumulated effect of errors in modelling each stage in the transmission process (Sellers & Gloster, in preparation) .
With all outbreaks of FMD rapid reporting and diagnosis of disease is important to initiate controls and prevent secondary spread. Laboratory diagnosis may be delayed if difficulties are experienced in transport of samples to the laboratory (Reid et al. 2006) . This also has a bearing on the rapidity, with which new information can be fed into the modelling process.
As can be seen from the above progress concerning our understanding of the role of airborne transmission has been made during the past few years and this has fed in to the operational decision support scheme used in the UK. However, it is recognised that as a minimum further work is required before the whole process can be captured in a single all encompassing accurate prediction model.
Conclusions:
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